Over 1000 Green Berets Sign Letter Supporting Second Amendment

This was an open letter and posted on 29 January 2013. Shortly after the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting a group of current and former U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers started talking about making a statement one the website Professional Soldiers. After a month of back and forth, edits, re-edits and re-re-edits it was finally ready. 

It was sent out privately to every Special Forces soldier available with the request that if they agreed with it, would they be willing to sign their name. The list was not made public but it was 100% verified that every single person who put their name down had graduated the Special Forces Qualifications course and was authorized to wear the Green Beret and Special Forces tab. 

After what happened in Orlando I thought it was important to put it back out for everyone to read.

I am honored that I was able to put my name on that list.  

Loren Schofield

De Oppresso Liber

Protecting the Second Amendment: Why all Americans  Should Be Concerned

We are current or former Army Reserve, National Guard, and active duty US Army Special Forces soldiers (Green Berets). We have all taken an oath to “...support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same.…” The Constitution of the United States is without a doubt the single greatest document in the history of mankind, codifying the fundamental principle of governmental power and authority being derived from and granted through the consent of the governed. Our Constitution established a system of governance that preserves, protects, and holds sacrosanct the individual rights and primacy of the governed as well as providing for the explicit protection of the governed from governmental tyranny and/or oppression. We have witnessed the insidious and iniquitous effects of tyranny and oppression on people all over the world. We and our forebears have embodied and personified our organizational motto, De Oppresso Liber [To Free the Oppressed], for more than a half century as we have fought, shed blood, and died in the pursuit of freedom for the oppressed.

Like you, we are also loving and caring fathers and grandfathers. Like you, we have been stunned, horrified, and angered by the tragedies of Columbine, Virginia Tech, Aurora, Fort Hood, and Sandy Hook; and like you, we are searching for solutions to the problem of gun-related crimes in our society. Many of us are educators in our second careers and have a special interest to find a solution to this problem. However, unlike much of the current vox populi reactions to this tragedy, we offer a different perspective.

First, we need to set the record straight on a few things. The current debate is over so-called “assault weapons” and high capacity magazines. The terms "assault weapon" and "assault rifle" are often confused. According to Bruce H. Kobayashi and Joseph E. Olson, writing in the Stanford Law and Policy Review, “Prior to 1989, the term ‘assault weapon’ did not exist in the lexicon of firearms. It is a political term [underline added for emphasis], developed by anti-gun publicists to expand the category of assault rifles.”

The M4A1 carbine is a U.S. military service rifle - it is an assault rifle. The AR-15 is not an assault rifle. The “AR” in its name does not stand for “Assault Rifle” - it is the designation from the first two letters of the manufacturer’s name – ArmaLite Corporation. The AR-15 is designed so that it cosmetically looks like the M4A1 carbine assault rifle, but it is impossible to configure the AR-15 to be a fully automatic assault rifle. It is a single shot semi-automatic rifle that can fire between 45 and 60 rounds per minute depending on the skill of the operator. The M4A1 can fire up to 950 rounds per minute. In 1986, the federal government banned the import or manufacture of new fully automatic firearms for sale to civilians. Therefore, the sale of assault rifles are already banned or heavily restricted!

The second part of the current debate is over “high capacity magazines” capable of holding more than 10 rounds in the magazine. As experts in military weapons of all types, it is our considered opinion that reducing magazine capacity from 30 rounds to 10 rounds will only require an additional 6 -8 seconds to change two empty 10 round magazines with full magazines. Would an increase of 6 –8 seconds make any real difference to the outcome in a mass shooting incident? In our opinion it would not. Outlawing such “high capacity magazines” would, however, outlaw a class of firearms that are “in common use”. As such this would be in contravention to the opinion expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court recent decisions.

Moreover, when the Federal Assault Weapons Ban became law in 1994, manufacturers began retooling to produce firearms and magazines that were compliant. One of those ban-compliant firearms was the Hi-Point 995, which was sold with ten-round magazines. In 1999, five years into the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, the Columbine High School massacre occurred. One of the perpetrators, Eric Harris, was armed with a Hi-Point 995. Undeterred by the ten-round capacity of his magazines, Harris simply brought more of them: thirteen magazines would be found in the massacre's aftermath. Harris fired 96 rounds before killing himself.

Now that we have those facts straight, in our opinion, it is too easy to conclude that the problem is guns and that the solution to the problem is more and stricter gun control laws. For politicians, it is politically expedient to take that position and pass more gun control laws and then claim to constituents that they have done the right thing in the interest of protecting our children. Who can argue with that? Of course we all want to find a solution. But, is the problem really guns? Would increasing gun regulation solve the problem? Did we outlaw cars to combat drunk driving?

What can we learn from experiences with this issue elsewhere? We cite the experience in Great Britain. Despite the absence of a “gun culture”, Great Britain, with one-fifth the population of the U.S., has experienced mass shootings that are eerily similar to those we have experienced in recent years. In 1987 a lone gunman killed 18 people in Hungerford. What followed was the Firearms Act of 1988 making registration mandatory and banning semi-automatic guns and pump-action shotguns. Despite this ban, on March 13, 1996 a disturbed 43-year old former scout leader, Thomas Hamilton, murdered 16 school children aged five and six and a teacher at a primary school in Dunblane, Scotland. Within a year and a half the Firearms Act was amended to ban all private ownership of hand guns. After both shootings there were amnesty periods resulting in the surrender of thousands of firearms and ammunition. Despite having the toughest gun control laws in the world, gun related crimes increased in 2003 by 35% over the previous year with firearms used in 9,974 recorded crimes in the preceding 12 months. Gun related homicides were up 32% over the same period. Overall, gun related crime had increased 65% since the Dunblane massacre and implementation of the toughest gun control laws in the developed world. In contrast, in 2009 (5 years after the Federal Assault Weapons Ban expired) total firearm related homicides in the U.S. declined by 9% from the 2005 high (Source: “FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Master File, Table 310, Murder Victims – Circumstances and Weapons Used or Cause of Death: 2000-2009”).

Continued at Professional Soldiers...

USSF and POLISH SOF CONDUCT CQB TRAINING

The Psychosis of Boredom

What is the difference between an ODA, and a Boy Scout Troop? Adult supervision.

It is said that war is hours of boredom interrupted by moments of terror, which is true. There are volumes written on how to train, deal, react go 0-60 in a heartbeat. Learning to breathe like you’re in a lamaz class. Hell, even Ricky Bobby had to learn how to control his fear so he could drive with a wild cougar in his car.

What hasn't been talked about as much is what happens to a man (Yes. I said man. It's not sexist - women just aren't this stupid.) when the monotony and boredom become too much, and a kind of euphoric insanity overtakes you. It is a strange phenomenon because very rarely does this madness affect only one person.

I had first heard about this affliction during the Q course. We had some Vietnam vets come and talk to us. They told a story.

After a failed attack on their camp, they spotted an unexploded white phosphorous mortar shell right outside the wire in the middle of their minefield. Well, the demo guy got some C4 and went out there to blow it up. Apparently, he had miscalculated the time fuse and it exploded while he was trying to wind his way back through the mine field. The guys telling this story were laughing their asses off, describing him hot-footing it around the mines while White Phosphorous is raining down all around. I didn't get it at the time, but I do now.

Disclaimer: I do not recommend any of these actions, even though every single one of them was totally worth it...at the time. (Until our wives found out, that is. Wives just don't have this child-like curiosity and wonder at all the amazing things that are possible.) Also, I swear to everyone reading that each story is true. Names will be hidden to protect the innocent and give them plausible deniability when confronted by angry spouses, who may not have heard some of these.

Afghanistan 2002

This was my entire team's first combat rotation. We were all nervous and excited, not knowing what to expect. After a month or two we had gotten our firebase built, and while construction was still ongoing, we weren't being run ragged like we had been at first. We were out patrolling a lot, but when we were back we had some downtime. That was when we came to the most dangerous epiphany that could possibly come to guys in a foreign land at the beginning of a brand new war. The fact that it took this long shows you how ingrained and brainwashed we all were by the modern peacetime Army. Our epiphany.....there is no Range Control at our Firebase.

Not only was there no Range Control, the closest adult supervision (B team) was over three hours away, through prime ambush areas over spine crushing roads. You don't really see the insanity at the time. It is only when looking back through the hazy lens of time do the "what the fucks" come.

I think the first time the insanity hit, I was standing on the edge of our Firebase looking down, far below, across our DZ to where we had set up our heavy weapons range. The range was on top of a deep cut that was not only a river bed, but also acted as a road. Across the stream/road was a tall ridgeline that ran parallel to our fire base. We would shoot our heavy weapons over the road and use the ridgeline as our impact zone. Right next to the firing line was the outline of an old compound we called the ruins. All that was left was the typical Afghan mud wall, about 3 feet high and about 2 feet thick.

The insanity hadn't completely taken a hold of me yet so I couldn't quite believe what I was seeing. I saw three of our guys shooting the 60 mm mortar, similar to this. They were standing about 15-20 meters from the ruins and seeing if they could get the round to land inside. They were holding the tube straight up and shooting it. Every once in a while they would shoot it, and a few seconds later they would all dive for cover and the round would hit danger close. They would get up, brush the dirt off and do it again.

In their defense, they got so they could set up right next to the compound and make it land inside...almost every time.

A few days later my Bravo was down there again, this time by himself doing the same exact thing, except this time he was using his 203 grenade launcher. By now, I was full in the clutches of this dangerous malady, so of course I went down and joined in. If you've never shot one, if you pay real close attention when you shoot, you can watch the grenade fly.

Trying to get a 40mm grenade to land 15 meters away is not easy. The wind, rotation of the earth, tides, the moon's gravity and global warming all come into play. Well, sometimes you would lose sight of it, or you would see it coming down where you're pretty sure it will be too close, so it then becomes necessary for you to throw yourself to the ground, in the opposite direction from where you think it might be heading (stupid global warming). But practice does make, if not perfect, at least less shitty, so by the end we getting most of them right in the ruins.

Sometimes it's not insanity that hits you, but a really "funny" idea on which you probably could have done a better cost-benefit analysis. As a Fox, I now know to look for 2nd and 3rd order effects, but sometimes a lack of critical thinking on your part makes your hilarious joke less funny for you, but infinitely more funny for everyone else. That happened to me on my third trip.

We were right next to FOB Salerno who had a medevac unit located there. Our medics had built a good relationship with the pilots, and they would come over and conduct training. Many times they needed to go pick someone up, so they would fly over and pick our 18Ds up to help out, so it was not uncommon to see the helicopters sitting out there on the airfield. I got to know the pilots and would sit around and bullshit with them.

Well, one afternoon I was out doing PT running around the airfield, in nothing but ranger panties, of course. I was at the end of the runway heading toward them as they were taking off. They were going to fly right over me so I quickly turned around and dropped my shorts, laughing at how clever and funny I was. Apparently, the pilot thought I was funny too, because he brought the helicopter to a hover...directly over me.

Even though I couldn't see due to the fact that I was blind in the middle of a tornado and every orifice was completely covered in dirt, I just knew they were laughing.

Dangers of Rapport

I wanted to write a short article on some of the dangers of rapport building and some things that you need to watch out for. I like to use the example of democracy in the Middle East. We can’t expect whatever form of democracy other people choose to be exactly like ours. It’s a foolish notion and one destined for failure. You have to find a middle ground that takes into account that countries history, culture and social norms.

When living and working with a different culture, building rapport, fighting and dying shoulder to shoulder with them, it is easy to become emotionally involved. It is easy, especially when they are honorable and likable, to find yourself assimilating with them. As I stated in The Importance of Rapport, the best advice I ever received is to never go more than 49% native. My first team sergeant understood rapport, but also the dangers that could come. It’s a fine line to walk, as is everything dealing with Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (especially during combat). Combat creates a bond, a brotherhood that is hard to break.

Many soldiers learn quickly to compartmentalize, and SOF are experts at it, but from my experience Special Forces are able to do it better than most.

Compartmentalized minds have diversified personalities which enable them to behave differently and appropriately in a variety of situations such that they can behave like a boss or worker on the job, a parent and/or spouse and/or grown child at home, a teammate on a sport, etc. To be competent in each area they are said to be good at “having boundaries” such that one role does not blur into another.

One of the challenges however of being highly compartmentalized is that over time, people may lean more and more into those compartments where they feel most competent, capable and confident. That can cause other compartments to either atrophy from disuse or in some cases never develop in the first place. Over time these people can appear to be more like “human doings” that don’t feel particularly present as people even as they appear quite competent in a particular function. Think of IT instead of HR.

I don’t know if it is a psychological trait that is looked for, but I do know that training quickly refines and expands it. The hard training that is involved starting at selection (and honestly, it never stops) is part of the mental selection and mental training. The ability to separate the pain and discomfort, and to push forward in spite of it, is just one way that is used to find people who have the ability to create those compartments or can already do it. If a person can’t do this effectively they will either quit or be booted out at some point during the training.

The reason I say Special Forces are better at being able to do this is because they are required to have more compartments. There is the family, deployment, team, group, army, and America. They also have to be able to fully immerse themselves with whatever local unit, tribe, sect, they happen to be working or interacting with they are working in Afghanistan or Iraq. Between combat deployments they are still conducting JCETs and non-combat FID in multiple foreign countries. Each of these examples has a different compartment, and each compartment has only what is needed to succeed in that one situation.

To understand how significant these compartments are, I will use myself as an example. Whenever I deployed (and there were a lot of them), I got into the habit of asking my wife and kids to drop me off and leave. I didn’t want them to wait with me or hang out like a lot of other families did. They would drop me off at the curb and we would say our goodbyes. I would watch them drive away, then go in and hang out or bullshit until it was time to load the plane.

Standing on the curb watching them drive away was the beginning for me. It was part of the process I developed to help me switch compartments. After the plane took off, I would take an Ambien and sleep for about four hours When I woke up the family compartment was locked up tight and the deployment compartment was open and ready to go. I would only open the family compartment when it was safe, or when I was on the phone talking to them. It was never opened fully, but cracked just enough to give me what I needed to talk to them. As soon as I hung up it was slammed down and locked back up. It was never opened fully until I walked back into my house.

And as I’m writing this and thinking about it, I have to admit that the family compartment never really completely opened while I was in. Knowing I had another deployment coming up, or could be sent somewhere with very little notice. This forced me to keep a tight hold on it so it could easily be shut on the next trip.

Some compartments necessitated switching from one to the other in the blink of an eye; others took time to prepare. In Kosovo, our primary mission was to act as liaisons between the locals and the U.S. General in charge of the American sector. We walked around in only a uniform and concealed pistol and had to be able to go from friendly conversation to sensing a threat and drawing in an instant. Some people refer to that as “flipping a switch,” which is a good analogy of going between times of quiet to sudden violence. 'Flipping a switch', while a good descriptive phrase, doesn’t change the fact that those situations required two very different compartments. If you couldn’t switch fast enough, you died.

People who can’t flip that switch either became too trusting or too friendly with locals, and forget exactly where they are, or they can’t relax and be in the moment. They would subconsciously perceive everyone as a threat, which the locals could easily sense. This created a lack of trust, which prevented the rapport from developing.

The point is that when you can compartmentalize, you are able to give 100% of your 49% (Naked gun 50/50 chance) to the people that you train and work with. This allows you to be better able to build that trust without losing yourself. You can keep the American and the U.S. Soldier compartment safe and switch when needed.

U.S. Army Special Forces / Green Berets / "De Oppresso Liber"

Ensuring Equality: More Combat Deaths For Women And Minorities

Colonel Mike Copenhayer, while not technically an “operator,” has spent a lot of time in SOF units, most likely screwing up awards, losing promotion packets, and generally making it as difficult as possible for the guys on the tip of the spear to do their job.

As the personnel officer who has been the J1 at the Joint Special Operations Command and G1 at the US Army Special Operations Command, he is part of the bureaucracy that has made life exceedingly difficult for a huge percentage of all Special Operations Force soldiers.

Not satisfied with only a mere “huge percentage,” Colonel Copenhayer sought to go further by writing “The Integration of Minorities into Special Operations: How Cultural Diversity Enhances Operations” while attending the United States Army War College.

Read more at Hit the Woodline

The Integration of Minorities into Special Operations?

DIVERSITY

Special Forces does not judge you based on your

 ethnicity or color of your skin. You are judged based on

 your performance.

Special Forces Primer: Lesson 2 - Foreign Internal Defens

First off, I apparently wasn't clear enough in my first article. SF = SPECIAL FORCES/GREEN BERETS ONLY!!!! 

After reading some Facebook comments, there seems to be a couple of other misconceptions. Please check out the US Special Operation's Command (USSOCOM)  structure. This  is an excellent high-resolution organizational chart that shows each and every unit under USSOCOM and where they fall. SF is not under JSOC, and I chose not to write about Delta Force/CAG because I was never in that unit. It is not my place to explain them. 

Because of our two recent conflicts, people tend to think that FID is the same thing as COIN and that anyone can do it. While many times there is a counter insurgency reason to conduct FID, there doesn't have to be.

During COIN, FID is a tool that can be used to better prepare Government Forces, whether military, law enforcement or helping a staff even up to the Cabinet level. In active war zones, FID can be used to create a unit from scratch, like in Iraq, or used to bolster the forces already there. During peace time, FID is used to conduct training specifically asked for by the Host Nation (HN).

In my previous article, I explained why not everyone can do COIN and many of the same lessons apply to FID. The unit conducting it must have an understanding of cultural differences and the ability to work with units that run the gamut, from barely off the farm to highly trained CT forces.

As with UW, knowing the language is important. There are many people who can do great things, but get them in front of a group of people who aren't American, and attempt to teach them how to do even the basics, and they either choke, get frustrated or pissed off. Whoever is conducting the training needs to be able to know what instructional method will work the best, and then be able to articulate that into another language and culture, many times without the use of PPT. Acting like a Drill Sgt screaming at them will most likely do the exact opposite of what you intended. Let’s be honest, if it was easy, the Coast Guard would be doing it.

Due to the rampant misunderstanding of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), it has been disrespected and mocked by the DA side of SOF, because it isn't as “sexy.” Ironically, it can be argued that FID is the most important mission in the U.S. global arsenal, especially since the wars are winding down. FID is a major tool that the U.S. has for fighting and preventing future wars or conflicts. Other SOF units are beginning to see this, which is why there has been an increase of improving UW/IW/FID capabilities.

But it is so much more than teaching people to wipe their ass and march in a straight line.

Foreign Internal Defense

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (JP 3-22)

I feel that FID should be broken down into two sub-categories, "Peace Time FID" and "Combat FID."

Combat FID

Special Forces/Green Berets have been going into combat with units that they have trained since they were created. Laos, Vietnam, El Salvador, Afghanistan and Iraq to name just a few. Many of the units had never previously existed and in fact were stood up by ODAs, They were created, trained, and when they are sufficiently trained, conduct combat ops.The ODAs mentored them through multiple deployments year after year. Many times SF soldiers made repeat trips and worked with the same FID partners,  

Lara Logan in Iraq

Whether you are talking about the Nungs or Rhades in Vietnam, or the multi ethnic elite ICTF in Iraq, the basics are all the same.

 US/ICTF firefight in Iraq

In the case of building a professional capability into the HN military, the final goal is for them to conduct operations on their own, with no U.S. forces involved. ICTF Unilateral ops (if you don't like haji music, turn the volume down). 

During the early stages, the Special Forces Soldiers will conduct all phases from training, planning, rehearsals and they will be in charge on the ground and lead the combat operation. As the HN force becomes better trained, the Special Forces soldiers will step back into a more advisory role, but still be with their FID partners through every phase from planning, to boots on the ground. They are with them, shoulder to shoulder with the HN, fighting and dying next to each other while acting as a liaison between the HN and U.S. assets. ( CAS, artillery, ISR or medevacs)

The end state of Combat FID is that you are attempting to work yourself out of a job. My crowning achievement with combat FID happened in 2008. My team was working in Baghdad with the 36th Commando Bn, which is a part of the Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF). We had received word that there was an HVT that the CFs had been trying to get for years, but he was constantly moving between Iraq and Iran, never sleeping in the same place for two nights in a row. This cat was slippery. We found out that he was going to be staying at the Baghdad hospital and submitted a CONOP; ready to roll when it was time. Our plan went all the way up to the General's staff where it was denied, because the target was in a hospital and it wasn't worth the potential PR nightmare if something went wrong.

As the 18F, I went to my Team Leader and Team Sgt after they had told me, and I made the recommendation to unleash our barbarians on the world, with no adult supervision. It was a risk because it had already been denied, but in '08 ISOF was coming into their own, and they had their own ROEs and launch requirements outside of the U.S. Chain of Command. As long as those conditions were met, they didn't need U.S. permission to go. My leadership talked it out and agreed.

We got the word and went down to the Bn leadership and briefed them on the mission and the situation. I told the commander that this was a chance for him to highlight the capabilities of his unit, police up a very bad man, and everyone would know that his unit was able to do this mission with no American support. (See what I did there? Because I had worked closely with them, I knew their capabilities, strengths, weakness and insecurities. Even though he was nervous going out without us, I knew exactly what buttons to push and what kind of motivation he needed to go out and get the guy that I wanted them to get. See The importance of rapport)

It was a completely unilateral Iraqi mission. We advised them on the planning and helped with Intel, but when they left the compound it was with a convoy of about 20 trucks, personally led by the Bn Cdr. It was a nervous night for my team leadership and me. If things went sideways, there was a very good chance that the hammer would come down on us. Even if you are completely right and justified, if a 3-star is pissed off, there's no ballistic protection that will save you.

A few hours later they came back, and I watched the Commando Bn CDR escort his prisoner into the detention facility. I could see the pride for his men even though he was trying to keep his face professional. They infiltrated into the gated hospital, surrounded the building this motherfucker was hiding in, and captured him without firing a shot or doing any significant damage to the hospital. It was funny because, even though I wanted to go out myself and be on the target with them, I had the exact same pride for the boys that he had.

Peacetime FID

Peacetime FID is best utilized when the HN agencies that are involved are already somewhat capable and are asking for U.S. assistance to get training in basic tasks; or when they are requesting specialized advanced training, usually by USSOF conducting Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). They are normally requested and approved through the Department of State, who then pass it to DOD.

When FID is requested and approved, it is usually in support of the overall strategic goals of the United States Government, because it provides a friendly Government with the capabilities to handle any internal or external threats with minimal direct U.S. involvement, while maintaining legitimacy of the Government and the respect of the local populace.

Peacetime FID is not a tactic for those who demand immediate gratification. It is a tool to be developed over many years, and used to create relationships between individuals and units at the operational level. The trust and respect that is built takes time, but when successful, it allows the U.S. to have not only regional experts who have been there many times, but also locals who have had good experience and look favorably on the U.S. When Peacetime FID done right, it prevents the need to send large conventional forces into hostile action because the situation deteriorated due to the inability of the HN military or Security Forces to handle it.

This is a great 40 min video showing SF working with the ANA Commando's and Afghan Special Forces.

Lesson 3 will finally answer the most asked question on the internet: “Who is better, SEALs or SF, Rangers or SF, any SOF unit, U.S. or Coalition vs. SF”... just kidding, I’ll answer it now. The answer is, and always will be, the Special Forces/Green Berets. (Although I may not be completely impartial.)

JADE HELM: Mastering your mom's, domain

Understanding "Jade Helm" Part 2: Why We Need This Kind of Training

If you missed Part 1 of this series, you can read it here.  And if you are not familiar with Special Forces history I recommend looking at my article Special Forces Primer: Lesson 1 – Correcting Misconceptions:

Special Forces traces its roots as the Army’s premier proponent of unconventional warfare from the Operational Groups and Jedburgh teams of the Office of Strategic Services. The OSS was formed in World War II to gather intelligence and conduct operations behind enemy lines in support of resistance groups in Europe and Burma. After the war, individuals such as Col. Aaron Bank, Col. Wendell Fertig and Lt. Col. Russell Volckmann used their wartime OSS experience to formulate the doctrine of unconventional warfare that became the cornerstone of the Special Forces. In June of 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was established under Col. Aaron Bank. Concurrently with this was the establishment of the Psychological Warfare School, which ultimately became today’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Special Forces Soldiers first saw combat in 1953 as individuals deployed from 10th SFG (A) to Korea.

For eight or nine years Special Forces was getting further and further away from their roots. As the GWOT progressed, Special Forces commanders were only giving lip service to UW. Instead they focused more and more on DA. During this time there were people within the community screaming, that we can’t lose our UW skills. Behind closed doors there was intense and extremely heated debates. From the team rooms to the highest level of command, up and down the hallways there was the argument on UW vs DA.

With Iraq over in 2011, and (at the time) what looked like U.S. troops being pulled out of Afghanistan, coupled with the downsizing of the military, Special Forces Command finally realized the need to rebuild their UW capabilities, and use the lessons we learned from over a decade of war. In July of 2012, LTG Charles T. Cleveland took command of the United States Special Operations Command (USASOC) and in April of 2013 released ARSOF 2022.

LTG Cleveland said in a 2014 interview:

Last year, USASOC took a major step forward by introducing ARSOF 2022 as our blueprint for the future. ARSOF 2022 sought to clarify the narrative for Army special operations, provide direction to the force, and establish a process for future force development that leads to better support of joint force commanders in the future environment. It set in motion a number of changes primarily focused on the tactical aspects of our business and exploring the beginnings of SOF operational art.

READ MORE AT HAVOK JOURNAL

THE IMPORTANCE OF RAPPORT

Rapport. Merriam’s says rapport is “relation characterized by harmony, conformity, accord, or affinity.” I can’t even begin to describe the importance the ability to build rapport brings to the team. It is one of the most overused words when talking about Foreign Internal Defense (FID) or Special Forces, but so many times it is either not really understood, or completely ignored. Even though the word may be overused, there are not many who truly understand it or are capable of applying it in real-world situations.

The ability to build rapport is one of, if not the most important skill Special Forces brings to the table. This importance starts in Robin Sage. After the brutally long infil, you have to conduct a link-up with a couple of guerillas (Gs) sent to guide you to the vicinity of their base (G base). When you do finally get there, you won’t be allowed into the G base. You probably won't be allowed to even meet the G chief for a few hours, or maybe not even until the next day.

You set up your own patrol base near them, but you are not allowed to move into the camp until you have built rapport with the—specifically, the G chief. If something happens, or doesn't happen, the team will find that their newfound rapport has been burned, and you will be kicked out of the camp and have to start over. You'll start back at square one, working just to be allowed to move back into the camp.

Many of the scenarios are designed to test you on your ability to teach and lead foreign troops, but ethical questions will pop up, and your reactions will be judged by the instructors, the Gs, and the G chief. Often, these scenarios deal with human-rights violations, and you are judged both on how you handle the situations internally and what happens after.

These ethical scenarios are important for two reasons. First, if you have developed a good relationship with the Gs and have strong rapport, you may be able to  convince them not to perform an act—an important lesson. Second, instructors can see how you react, or how you deal with difficult situations. What did you do or say that would negatively affect your future relationship with the Gs, and most importantly, the mission?

My mission during Robin Sage was to secure and set up the drop zone (DZ) for a resupply operation. Two Gs and I went early in the morning to conduct reconnaissance on the DZ. Our job was to initially make sure it was clear, watch it throughout the day, then, at night, set it up and receive the bundles.

My guys were playing the part of the surly Gs perfectly. Initially, nothing came easy with them, and I had to use all my powers of persuasion to get them to do anything. As we were sitting on the edge of the clearing all day, bored out of our minds, something changed. They realized they liked me, and things became easier. They opened up, and eventually I even got them to break character. One of them worked at the hospital, and this was his fourth time doing Robin Sage. I was able to get some good info from him for the rest of the exercise.

Rapport, not just for foreign troops

I learned something incredibly important during that exercise: Rapport building is not only important for working with local nationals (LN), it can be used in pretty much every part of your life.

When I first got to Group, the command sergeant major told us, as part of his in-brief, that he wanted us to “practice your rapport skills with the conventional soldiers here on base.” He was kind of a turd (couldn’t wear our issued cold-weather gear or issued boots on main post, we could only wear it in the field or at a range), and I’m pretty sure he just said that so we wouldn’t piss off the conventional 1SGs or sergeant majors, but that line always stuck with me.

I started implementing it with the support guys (especially the commo section) and other sections, units, or individuals I came in contact with. Sometimes it was because I needed something from them, sometimes it was because I might need something from them in the future. Sometimes it was because I’m just a friendly person, and once or twice it was because she had big boobs.

The difference between building rapport and “just being a nice guy” is the motivation behind it. Often, those two will intersect nicely; other times, they will clash. When someone goes out with the intention of building rapport, it is usually because there is a reason. The reasons run the gamut from "I want them to follow me into a house where bad guys are," to "when I leave, I want them to have good thoughts when they think about America." You may need them to protect your life, or you may be asking them to risk theirs.

Just because this sounds very calculated, manipulative, and selfish, doesn’t necessarily mean it’s bad. It usually is like that because it has to be. Just because it’s calculated doesn’t mean it’s not real or honest. There are many reasons someone chooses to help you, but when push comes to shove, and the shady shit starts to happen, the only reason they will help you is because they personally like you.

People can sense when they are being used, and often can sense how you really feel about them. If you walk around with a big ego, thinking you are better than everyone, it won’t take you far. I am still friends to this day with some of the commo guys. I started out knowing I would need their help someday, and I wanted to have a relationship with them. Just because there are calculations behind it doesn’t mean it has to be phony.

I believe rapport-building skills can and should be utilized in all walks of life. It is not just for the Special Forces soldier teaching basic rifle marksmanship in the Philippines, it can also be used when you are dealing with Afghani tribal elders, the colonel from the 101^st who owns the battle space you want to work in, your coworkers, or Bianca, the really hot chick who works at the coffee shop.

Loren's rules for building rapport

1. Understand their culture. This is so important. Without an understanding of the rules, how can you ever hope to play the game? The culture could be a multi-ethnic religious tribal understanding. You might be dealing with a conventional army unit whose senior leadership "hates those guys with beards." It could be office politics, understanding the unofficial hierarchy where you work, or wooing the cute girl in your building who looks great in yoga pants. You have to learn the rules, or you will blow your rapport before you even start.

2. The Golden Rule: Treat others like you want to be treated. Know that people around the world may be very different from you, but if you look hard enough, you will realize that there are similarities. All people want to be treated with respect and dignity, and feel that they are valued. They need to believe that they have something to offer, and be listened to.

This is probably the most important. This has to be real, or at least as real as you can possibly get. If someone is just a generally worthless human, with few redeeming qualities, try to find at least one little thing to focus on. People often know if someone is pretending or lying, so when you interact with them, think about the things they may do right, or a positive quality.

It’s not a time for egos or attitudes. If you go in with the “ugly American” attitude, not only are you headed for failure, but you could be developing an environment ripe for the enemy to use. By disenfranchising potential allies, you are giving the enemy the environment needed to co-opt your soldiers for intelligence purposes or for direct attacks. The Institute for the Study of War studied green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan from 2007-2012, and they suggest that:

There are two main narratives purporting to explain why green-on-blue attacks happen and why they are happening more frequently: grievances and infiltration. Grievance-based insider attacks occur because of cultural misunderstandings between foreign and Afghan troops, low morale, and revenge for perceived insults or provocations. Attacks caused by insurgent initiative are pre-planned violence organized by groups like the Quetta Shura Taliban or their Haqqani Network associates who have infiltrated the ANSF or influenced existing members to execute attacks.

3. In all your interactions, be genuine (or as genuine as you possibly can). This goes right along with rule number two. People intuitively know when you aren’t being real. They can sense when they are being used. Sometimes that’s okay. When you both have something the other wants, then that can be used. But understand the relationship will only last as long as it is mutually beneficial.

4. Find out their motivation. Even before the first time you meet them, you should be studying. Learn as much as you can about their culture and their society. Try to learn the rules. If you know people who have been there and know the different personalities, talk to them and ask them questions. From the first time you meet, you need to listen and assess what is said, learn to hear what wasn’t said, and try to understand them. Try and see what makes them tick. What is their motivation? What do they want or need? Don’t go in with your preconceived notions set in stone; everything must be fluid. Very often, the truth on the ground is different than what you originally thought.

5. Come up with a plan. During every interaction, more information or data will come to you. Learn to be able to see those little pieces, and understand what they are and what they mean. Some information may not be useful now, but it very well might come in handy in the future. Figure out what you want, what they want, and then try to come up with a plan where all parties win. This is not espionage or trying to get dirt on someone, this is attempting to build relationships with people where everyone benefits.

The best analogy to explain the difference between building rapport and building relationships for more sinister motivations such as espionage, is the act of trying to meet girls. Take, for example, those who are just trying to meet girls to get laid, have a one-night stand, and then bounce, versus those who are trying to meet a girl because they think they could have a real relationship with her. The latter would be what I consider rapport.

6. Be willing to invest time, money, or assets. For this relationship to be real, for it to be more than just both of you temporarily using each other, it takes time. It doesn't happen overnight; it takes time, energy, trust, and coming through with what you promised. Helping them without expecting anything back, eating dinner with them, drinking tea, participating with them through hard times and common struggles. When they know you are willing to put your money, time, energy, and body on the line for them, they will start to open up. That is when the important stuff happens.

I will finish this up with a couple of points.

• Never promise them something you are not 100 percent sure you can deliver on. If you say you can do or deliver something, be damn sure you can follow through.
• Never go more than 49-percent native. You may empathize, sympathize, and genuinely like the people you are working with. That’s good. That’s what you want. But in a military setting, never forget that you are an American, and a representative of America. It’s easy to get sucked in with those men you’ve sweated and bled alongside, but in the end, you do what you are told. In the civilian world, don’t give up so much of yourself that you forget who you truly are.

This video is textbook in what not to do when conducting FID and attempting to build rapport: How not to do FID.