USSF and POLISH SOF CONDUCT CQB TRAINING

Dangers of Rapport

I wanted to write a short article on some of the dangers of rapport building and some things that you need to watch out for. I like to use the example of democracy in the Middle East. We can’t expect whatever form of democracy other people choose to be exactly like ours. It’s a foolish notion and one destined for failure. You have to find a middle ground that takes into account that countries history, culture and social norms.

When living and working with a different culture, building rapport, fighting and dying shoulder to shoulder with them, it is easy to become emotionally involved. It is easy, especially when they are honorable and likable, to find yourself assimilating with them. As I stated in The Importance of Rapport, the best advice I ever received is to never go more than 49% native. My first team sergeant understood rapport, but also the dangers that could come. It’s a fine line to walk, as is everything dealing with Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (especially during combat). Combat creates a bond, a brotherhood that is hard to break.

Many soldiers learn quickly to compartmentalize, and SOF are experts at it, but from my experience Special Forces are able to do it better than most.

Compartmentalized minds have diversified personalities which enable them to behave differently and appropriately in a variety of situations such that they can behave like a boss or worker on the job, a parent and/or spouse and/or grown child at home, a teammate on a sport, etc. To be competent in each area they are said to be good at “having boundaries” such that one role does not blur into another.

One of the challenges however of being highly compartmentalized is that over time, people may lean more and more into those compartments where they feel most competent, capable and confident. That can cause other compartments to either atrophy from disuse or in some cases never develop in the first place. Over time these people can appear to be more like “human doings” that don’t feel particularly present as people even as they appear quite competent in a particular function. Think of IT instead of HR.

I don’t know if it is a psychological trait that is looked for, but I do know that training quickly refines and expands it. The hard training that is involved starting at selection (and honestly, it never stops) is part of the mental selection and mental training. The ability to separate the pain and discomfort, and to push forward in spite of it, is just one way that is used to find people who have the ability to create those compartments or can already do it. If a person can’t do this effectively they will either quit or be booted out at some point during the training.

The reason I say Special Forces are better at being able to do this is because they are required to have more compartments. There is the family, deployment, team, group, army, and America. They also have to be able to fully immerse themselves with whatever local unit, tribe, sect, they happen to be working or interacting with they are working in Afghanistan or Iraq. Between combat deployments they are still conducting JCETs and non-combat FID in multiple foreign countries. Each of these examples has a different compartment, and each compartment has only what is needed to succeed in that one situation.

To understand how significant these compartments are, I will use myself as an example. Whenever I deployed (and there were a lot of them), I got into the habit of asking my wife and kids to drop me off and leave. I didn’t want them to wait with me or hang out like a lot of other families did. They would drop me off at the curb and we would say our goodbyes. I would watch them drive away, then go in and hang out or bullshit until it was time to load the plane.

Standing on the curb watching them drive away was the beginning for me. It was part of the process I developed to help me switch compartments. After the plane took off, I would take an Ambien and sleep for about four hours When I woke up the family compartment was locked up tight and the deployment compartment was open and ready to go. I would only open the family compartment when it was safe, or when I was on the phone talking to them. It was never opened fully, but cracked just enough to give me what I needed to talk to them. As soon as I hung up it was slammed down and locked back up. It was never opened fully until I walked back into my house.

And as I’m writing this and thinking about it, I have to admit that the family compartment never really completely opened while I was in. Knowing I had another deployment coming up, or could be sent somewhere with very little notice. This forced me to keep a tight hold on it so it could easily be shut on the next trip.

Some compartments necessitated switching from one to the other in the blink of an eye; others took time to prepare. In Kosovo, our primary mission was to act as liaisons between the locals and the U.S. General in charge of the American sector. We walked around in only a uniform and concealed pistol and had to be able to go from friendly conversation to sensing a threat and drawing in an instant. Some people refer to that as “flipping a switch,” which is a good analogy of going between times of quiet to sudden violence. 'Flipping a switch', while a good descriptive phrase, doesn’t change the fact that those situations required two very different compartments. If you couldn’t switch fast enough, you died.

People who can’t flip that switch either became too trusting or too friendly with locals, and forget exactly where they are, or they can’t relax and be in the moment. They would subconsciously perceive everyone as a threat, which the locals could easily sense. This created a lack of trust, which prevented the rapport from developing.

The point is that when you can compartmentalize, you are able to give 100% of your 49% (Naked gun 50/50 chance) to the people that you train and work with. This allows you to be better able to build that trust without losing yourself. You can keep the American and the U.S. Soldier compartment safe and switch when needed.

U.S. Army Special Forces / Green Berets / "De Oppresso Liber"

Special Forces Primer: Lesson 2 - Foreign Internal Defens

First off, I apparently wasn't clear enough in my first article. SF = SPECIAL FORCES/GREEN BERETS ONLY!!!! 

After reading some Facebook comments, there seems to be a couple of other misconceptions. Please check out the US Special Operation's Command (USSOCOM)  structure. This  is an excellent high-resolution organizational chart that shows each and every unit under USSOCOM and where they fall. SF is not under JSOC, and I chose not to write about Delta Force/CAG because I was never in that unit. It is not my place to explain them. 

Because of our two recent conflicts, people tend to think that FID is the same thing as COIN and that anyone can do it. While many times there is a counter insurgency reason to conduct FID, there doesn't have to be.

During COIN, FID is a tool that can be used to better prepare Government Forces, whether military, law enforcement or helping a staff even up to the Cabinet level. In active war zones, FID can be used to create a unit from scratch, like in Iraq, or used to bolster the forces already there. During peace time, FID is used to conduct training specifically asked for by the Host Nation (HN).

In my previous article, I explained why not everyone can do COIN and many of the same lessons apply to FID. The unit conducting it must have an understanding of cultural differences and the ability to work with units that run the gamut, from barely off the farm to highly trained CT forces.

As with UW, knowing the language is important. There are many people who can do great things, but get them in front of a group of people who aren't American, and attempt to teach them how to do even the basics, and they either choke, get frustrated or pissed off. Whoever is conducting the training needs to be able to know what instructional method will work the best, and then be able to articulate that into another language and culture, many times without the use of PPT. Acting like a Drill Sgt screaming at them will most likely do the exact opposite of what you intended. Let’s be honest, if it was easy, the Coast Guard would be doing it.

Due to the rampant misunderstanding of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), it has been disrespected and mocked by the DA side of SOF, because it isn't as “sexy.” Ironically, it can be argued that FID is the most important mission in the U.S. global arsenal, especially since the wars are winding down. FID is a major tool that the U.S. has for fighting and preventing future wars or conflicts. Other SOF units are beginning to see this, which is why there has been an increase of improving UW/IW/FID capabilities.

But it is so much more than teaching people to wipe their ass and march in a straight line.

Foreign Internal Defense

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (JP 3-22)

I feel that FID should be broken down into two sub-categories, "Peace Time FID" and "Combat FID."

Combat FID

Special Forces/Green Berets have been going into combat with units that they have trained since they were created. Laos, Vietnam, El Salvador, Afghanistan and Iraq to name just a few. Many of the units had never previously existed and in fact were stood up by ODAs, They were created, trained, and when they are sufficiently trained, conduct combat ops.The ODAs mentored them through multiple deployments year after year. Many times SF soldiers made repeat trips and worked with the same FID partners,  

Lara Logan in Iraq

Whether you are talking about the Nungs or Rhades in Vietnam, or the multi ethnic elite ICTF in Iraq, the basics are all the same.

 US/ICTF firefight in Iraq

In the case of building a professional capability into the HN military, the final goal is for them to conduct operations on their own, with no U.S. forces involved. ICTF Unilateral ops (if you don't like haji music, turn the volume down). 

During the early stages, the Special Forces Soldiers will conduct all phases from training, planning, rehearsals and they will be in charge on the ground and lead the combat operation. As the HN force becomes better trained, the Special Forces soldiers will step back into a more advisory role, but still be with their FID partners through every phase from planning, to boots on the ground. They are with them, shoulder to shoulder with the HN, fighting and dying next to each other while acting as a liaison between the HN and U.S. assets. ( CAS, artillery, ISR or medevacs)

The end state of Combat FID is that you are attempting to work yourself out of a job. My crowning achievement with combat FID happened in 2008. My team was working in Baghdad with the 36th Commando Bn, which is a part of the Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF). We had received word that there was an HVT that the CFs had been trying to get for years, but he was constantly moving between Iraq and Iran, never sleeping in the same place for two nights in a row. This cat was slippery. We found out that he was going to be staying at the Baghdad hospital and submitted a CONOP; ready to roll when it was time. Our plan went all the way up to the General's staff where it was denied, because the target was in a hospital and it wasn't worth the potential PR nightmare if something went wrong.

As the 18F, I went to my Team Leader and Team Sgt after they had told me, and I made the recommendation to unleash our barbarians on the world, with no adult supervision. It was a risk because it had already been denied, but in '08 ISOF was coming into their own, and they had their own ROEs and launch requirements outside of the U.S. Chain of Command. As long as those conditions were met, they didn't need U.S. permission to go. My leadership talked it out and agreed.

We got the word and went down to the Bn leadership and briefed them on the mission and the situation. I told the commander that this was a chance for him to highlight the capabilities of his unit, police up a very bad man, and everyone would know that his unit was able to do this mission with no American support. (See what I did there? Because I had worked closely with them, I knew their capabilities, strengths, weakness and insecurities. Even though he was nervous going out without us, I knew exactly what buttons to push and what kind of motivation he needed to go out and get the guy that I wanted them to get. See The importance of rapport)

It was a completely unilateral Iraqi mission. We advised them on the planning and helped with Intel, but when they left the compound it was with a convoy of about 20 trucks, personally led by the Bn Cdr. It was a nervous night for my team leadership and me. If things went sideways, there was a very good chance that the hammer would come down on us. Even if you are completely right and justified, if a 3-star is pissed off, there's no ballistic protection that will save you.

A few hours later they came back, and I watched the Commando Bn CDR escort his prisoner into the detention facility. I could see the pride for his men even though he was trying to keep his face professional. They infiltrated into the gated hospital, surrounded the building this motherfucker was hiding in, and captured him without firing a shot or doing any significant damage to the hospital. It was funny because, even though I wanted to go out myself and be on the target with them, I had the exact same pride for the boys that he had.

Peacetime FID

Peacetime FID is best utilized when the HN agencies that are involved are already somewhat capable and are asking for U.S. assistance to get training in basic tasks; or when they are requesting specialized advanced training, usually by USSOF conducting Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). They are normally requested and approved through the Department of State, who then pass it to DOD.

When FID is requested and approved, it is usually in support of the overall strategic goals of the United States Government, because it provides a friendly Government with the capabilities to handle any internal or external threats with minimal direct U.S. involvement, while maintaining legitimacy of the Government and the respect of the local populace.

Peacetime FID is not a tactic for those who demand immediate gratification. It is a tool to be developed over many years, and used to create relationships between individuals and units at the operational level. The trust and respect that is built takes time, but when successful, it allows the U.S. to have not only regional experts who have been there many times, but also locals who have had good experience and look favorably on the U.S. When Peacetime FID done right, it prevents the need to send large conventional forces into hostile action because the situation deteriorated due to the inability of the HN military or Security Forces to handle it.

This is a great 40 min video showing SF working with the ANA Commando's and Afghan Special Forces.

Lesson 3 will finally answer the most asked question on the internet: “Who is better, SEALs or SF, Rangers or SF, any SOF unit, U.S. or Coalition vs. SF”... just kidding, I’ll answer it now. The answer is, and always will be, the Special Forces/Green Berets. (Although I may not be completely impartial.)

Understanding "Jade Helm" Part 2: Why We Need This Kind of Training

If you missed Part 1 of this series, you can read it here.  And if you are not familiar with Special Forces history I recommend looking at my article Special Forces Primer: Lesson 1 – Correcting Misconceptions:

Special Forces traces its roots as the Army’s premier proponent of unconventional warfare from the Operational Groups and Jedburgh teams of the Office of Strategic Services. The OSS was formed in World War II to gather intelligence and conduct operations behind enemy lines in support of resistance groups in Europe and Burma. After the war, individuals such as Col. Aaron Bank, Col. Wendell Fertig and Lt. Col. Russell Volckmann used their wartime OSS experience to formulate the doctrine of unconventional warfare that became the cornerstone of the Special Forces. In June of 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was established under Col. Aaron Bank. Concurrently with this was the establishment of the Psychological Warfare School, which ultimately became today’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Special Forces Soldiers first saw combat in 1953 as individuals deployed from 10th SFG (A) to Korea.

For eight or nine years Special Forces was getting further and further away from their roots. As the GWOT progressed, Special Forces commanders were only giving lip service to UW. Instead they focused more and more on DA. During this time there were people within the community screaming, that we can’t lose our UW skills. Behind closed doors there was intense and extremely heated debates. From the team rooms to the highest level of command, up and down the hallways there was the argument on UW vs DA.

With Iraq over in 2011, and (at the time) what looked like U.S. troops being pulled out of Afghanistan, coupled with the downsizing of the military, Special Forces Command finally realized the need to rebuild their UW capabilities, and use the lessons we learned from over a decade of war. In July of 2012, LTG Charles T. Cleveland took command of the United States Special Operations Command (USASOC) and in April of 2013 released ARSOF 2022.

LTG Cleveland said in a 2014 interview:

Last year, USASOC took a major step forward by introducing ARSOF 2022 as our blueprint for the future. ARSOF 2022 sought to clarify the narrative for Army special operations, provide direction to the force, and establish a process for future force development that leads to better support of joint force commanders in the future environment. It set in motion a number of changes primarily focused on the tactical aspects of our business and exploring the beginnings of SOF operational art.

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