Special Forces Primer: Lesson 2 - Foreign Internal Defens

First off, I apparently wasn't clear enough in my first article. SF = SPECIAL FORCES/GREEN BERETS ONLY!!!! 

After reading some Facebook comments, there seems to be a couple of other misconceptions. Please check out the US Special Operation's Command (USSOCOM)  structure. This  is an excellent high-resolution organizational chart that shows each and every unit under USSOCOM and where they fall. SF is not under JSOC, and I chose not to write about Delta Force/CAG because I was never in that unit. It is not my place to explain them. 

Because of our two recent conflicts, people tend to think that FID is the same thing as COIN and that anyone can do it. While many times there is a counter insurgency reason to conduct FID, there doesn't have to be.

During COIN, FID is a tool that can be used to better prepare Government Forces, whether military, law enforcement or helping a staff even up to the Cabinet level. In active war zones, FID can be used to create a unit from scratch, like in Iraq, or used to bolster the forces already there. During peace time, FID is used to conduct training specifically asked for by the Host Nation (HN).

In my previous article, I explained why not everyone can do COIN and many of the same lessons apply to FID. The unit conducting it must have an understanding of cultural differences and the ability to work with units that run the gamut, from barely off the farm to highly trained CT forces.

As with UW, knowing the language is important. There are many people who can do great things, but get them in front of a group of people who aren't American, and attempt to teach them how to do even the basics, and they either choke, get frustrated or pissed off. Whoever is conducting the training needs to be able to know what instructional method will work the best, and then be able to articulate that into another language and culture, many times without the use of PPT. Acting like a Drill Sgt screaming at them will most likely do the exact opposite of what you intended. Let’s be honest, if it was easy, the Coast Guard would be doing it.

Due to the rampant misunderstanding of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), it has been disrespected and mocked by the DA side of SOF, because it isn't as “sexy.” Ironically, it can be argued that FID is the most important mission in the U.S. global arsenal, especially since the wars are winding down. FID is a major tool that the U.S. has for fighting and preventing future wars or conflicts. Other SOF units are beginning to see this, which is why there has been an increase of improving UW/IW/FID capabilities.

But it is so much more than teaching people to wipe their ass and march in a straight line.

Foreign Internal Defense

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (JP 3-22)

I feel that FID should be broken down into two sub-categories, "Peace Time FID" and "Combat FID."

Combat FID

Special Forces/Green Berets have been going into combat with units that they have trained since they were created. Laos, Vietnam, El Salvador, Afghanistan and Iraq to name just a few. Many of the units had never previously existed and in fact were stood up by ODAs, They were created, trained, and when they are sufficiently trained, conduct combat ops.The ODAs mentored them through multiple deployments year after year. Many times SF soldiers made repeat trips and worked with the same FID partners,  

Lara Logan in Iraq

Whether you are talking about the Nungs or Rhades in Vietnam, or the multi ethnic elite ICTF in Iraq, the basics are all the same.

 US/ICTF firefight in Iraq

In the case of building a professional capability into the HN military, the final goal is for them to conduct operations on their own, with no U.S. forces involved. ICTF Unilateral ops (if you don't like haji music, turn the volume down). 

During the early stages, the Special Forces Soldiers will conduct all phases from training, planning, rehearsals and they will be in charge on the ground and lead the combat operation. As the HN force becomes better trained, the Special Forces soldiers will step back into a more advisory role, but still be with their FID partners through every phase from planning, to boots on the ground. They are with them, shoulder to shoulder with the HN, fighting and dying next to each other while acting as a liaison between the HN and U.S. assets. ( CAS, artillery, ISR or medevacs)

The end state of Combat FID is that you are attempting to work yourself out of a job. My crowning achievement with combat FID happened in 2008. My team was working in Baghdad with the 36th Commando Bn, which is a part of the Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF). We had received word that there was an HVT that the CFs had been trying to get for years, but he was constantly moving between Iraq and Iran, never sleeping in the same place for two nights in a row. This cat was slippery. We found out that he was going to be staying at the Baghdad hospital and submitted a CONOP; ready to roll when it was time. Our plan went all the way up to the General's staff where it was denied, because the target was in a hospital and it wasn't worth the potential PR nightmare if something went wrong.

As the 18F, I went to my Team Leader and Team Sgt after they had told me, and I made the recommendation to unleash our barbarians on the world, with no adult supervision. It was a risk because it had already been denied, but in '08 ISOF was coming into their own, and they had their own ROEs and launch requirements outside of the U.S. Chain of Command. As long as those conditions were met, they didn't need U.S. permission to go. My leadership talked it out and agreed.

We got the word and went down to the Bn leadership and briefed them on the mission and the situation. I told the commander that this was a chance for him to highlight the capabilities of his unit, police up a very bad man, and everyone would know that his unit was able to do this mission with no American support. (See what I did there? Because I had worked closely with them, I knew their capabilities, strengths, weakness and insecurities. Even though he was nervous going out without us, I knew exactly what buttons to push and what kind of motivation he needed to go out and get the guy that I wanted them to get. See The importance of rapport)

It was a completely unilateral Iraqi mission. We advised them on the planning and helped with Intel, but when they left the compound it was with a convoy of about 20 trucks, personally led by the Bn Cdr. It was a nervous night for my team leadership and me. If things went sideways, there was a very good chance that the hammer would come down on us. Even if you are completely right and justified, if a 3-star is pissed off, there's no ballistic protection that will save you.

A few hours later they came back, and I watched the Commando Bn CDR escort his prisoner into the detention facility. I could see the pride for his men even though he was trying to keep his face professional. They infiltrated into the gated hospital, surrounded the building this motherfucker was hiding in, and captured him without firing a shot or doing any significant damage to the hospital. It was funny because, even though I wanted to go out myself and be on the target with them, I had the exact same pride for the boys that he had.

Peacetime FID

Peacetime FID is best utilized when the HN agencies that are involved are already somewhat capable and are asking for U.S. assistance to get training in basic tasks; or when they are requesting specialized advanced training, usually by USSOF conducting Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). They are normally requested and approved through the Department of State, who then pass it to DOD.

When FID is requested and approved, it is usually in support of the overall strategic goals of the United States Government, because it provides a friendly Government with the capabilities to handle any internal or external threats with minimal direct U.S. involvement, while maintaining legitimacy of the Government and the respect of the local populace.

Peacetime FID is not a tactic for those who demand immediate gratification. It is a tool to be developed over many years, and used to create relationships between individuals and units at the operational level. The trust and respect that is built takes time, but when successful, it allows the U.S. to have not only regional experts who have been there many times, but also locals who have had good experience and look favorably on the U.S. When Peacetime FID done right, it prevents the need to send large conventional forces into hostile action because the situation deteriorated due to the inability of the HN military or Security Forces to handle it.

This is a great 40 min video showing SF working with the ANA Commando's and Afghan Special Forces.

Lesson 3 will finally answer the most asked question on the internet: “Who is better, SEALs or SF, Rangers or SF, any SOF unit, U.S. or Coalition vs. SF”... just kidding, I’ll answer it now. The answer is, and always will be, the Special Forces/Green Berets. (Although I may not be completely impartial.)

THE IMPORTANCE OF RAPPORT

Rapport. Merriam’s says rapport is “relation characterized by harmony, conformity, accord, or affinity.” I can’t even begin to describe the importance the ability to build rapport brings to the team. It is one of the most overused words when talking about Foreign Internal Defense (FID) or Special Forces, but so many times it is either not really understood, or completely ignored. Even though the word may be overused, there are not many who truly understand it or are capable of applying it in real-world situations.

The ability to build rapport is one of, if not the most important skill Special Forces brings to the table. This importance starts in Robin Sage. After the brutally long infil, you have to conduct a link-up with a couple of guerillas (Gs) sent to guide you to the vicinity of their base (G base). When you do finally get there, you won’t be allowed into the G base. You probably won't be allowed to even meet the G chief for a few hours, or maybe not even until the next day.

You set up your own patrol base near them, but you are not allowed to move into the camp until you have built rapport with the—specifically, the G chief. If something happens, or doesn't happen, the team will find that their newfound rapport has been burned, and you will be kicked out of the camp and have to start over. You'll start back at square one, working just to be allowed to move back into the camp.

Many of the scenarios are designed to test you on your ability to teach and lead foreign troops, but ethical questions will pop up, and your reactions will be judged by the instructors, the Gs, and the G chief. Often, these scenarios deal with human-rights violations, and you are judged both on how you handle the situations internally and what happens after.

These ethical scenarios are important for two reasons. First, if you have developed a good relationship with the Gs and have strong rapport, you may be able to  convince them not to perform an act—an important lesson. Second, instructors can see how you react, or how you deal with difficult situations. What did you do or say that would negatively affect your future relationship with the Gs, and most importantly, the mission?

My mission during Robin Sage was to secure and set up the drop zone (DZ) for a resupply operation. Two Gs and I went early in the morning to conduct reconnaissance on the DZ. Our job was to initially make sure it was clear, watch it throughout the day, then, at night, set it up and receive the bundles.

My guys were playing the part of the surly Gs perfectly. Initially, nothing came easy with them, and I had to use all my powers of persuasion to get them to do anything. As we were sitting on the edge of the clearing all day, bored out of our minds, something changed. They realized they liked me, and things became easier. They opened up, and eventually I even got them to break character. One of them worked at the hospital, and this was his fourth time doing Robin Sage. I was able to get some good info from him for the rest of the exercise.

Rapport, not just for foreign troops

I learned something incredibly important during that exercise: Rapport building is not only important for working with local nationals (LN), it can be used in pretty much every part of your life.

When I first got to Group, the command sergeant major told us, as part of his in-brief, that he wanted us to “practice your rapport skills with the conventional soldiers here on base.” He was kind of a turd (couldn’t wear our issued cold-weather gear or issued boots on main post, we could only wear it in the field or at a range), and I’m pretty sure he just said that so we wouldn’t piss off the conventional 1SGs or sergeant majors, but that line always stuck with me.

I started implementing it with the support guys (especially the commo section) and other sections, units, or individuals I came in contact with. Sometimes it was because I needed something from them, sometimes it was because I might need something from them in the future. Sometimes it was because I’m just a friendly person, and once or twice it was because she had big boobs.

The difference between building rapport and “just being a nice guy” is the motivation behind it. Often, those two will intersect nicely; other times, they will clash. When someone goes out with the intention of building rapport, it is usually because there is a reason. The reasons run the gamut from "I want them to follow me into a house where bad guys are," to "when I leave, I want them to have good thoughts when they think about America." You may need them to protect your life, or you may be asking them to risk theirs.

Just because this sounds very calculated, manipulative, and selfish, doesn’t necessarily mean it’s bad. It usually is like that because it has to be. Just because it’s calculated doesn’t mean it’s not real or honest. There are many reasons someone chooses to help you, but when push comes to shove, and the shady shit starts to happen, the only reason they will help you is because they personally like you.

People can sense when they are being used, and often can sense how you really feel about them. If you walk around with a big ego, thinking you are better than everyone, it won’t take you far. I am still friends to this day with some of the commo guys. I started out knowing I would need their help someday, and I wanted to have a relationship with them. Just because there are calculations behind it doesn’t mean it has to be phony.

I believe rapport-building skills can and should be utilized in all walks of life. It is not just for the Special Forces soldier teaching basic rifle marksmanship in the Philippines, it can also be used when you are dealing with Afghani tribal elders, the colonel from the 101^st who owns the battle space you want to work in, your coworkers, or Bianca, the really hot chick who works at the coffee shop.

Loren's rules for building rapport

1. Understand their culture. This is so important. Without an understanding of the rules, how can you ever hope to play the game? The culture could be a multi-ethnic religious tribal understanding. You might be dealing with a conventional army unit whose senior leadership "hates those guys with beards." It could be office politics, understanding the unofficial hierarchy where you work, or wooing the cute girl in your building who looks great in yoga pants. You have to learn the rules, or you will blow your rapport before you even start.

2. The Golden Rule: Treat others like you want to be treated. Know that people around the world may be very different from you, but if you look hard enough, you will realize that there are similarities. All people want to be treated with respect and dignity, and feel that they are valued. They need to believe that they have something to offer, and be listened to.

This is probably the most important. This has to be real, or at least as real as you can possibly get. If someone is just a generally worthless human, with few redeeming qualities, try to find at least one little thing to focus on. People often know if someone is pretending or lying, so when you interact with them, think about the things they may do right, or a positive quality.

It’s not a time for egos or attitudes. If you go in with the “ugly American” attitude, not only are you headed for failure, but you could be developing an environment ripe for the enemy to use. By disenfranchising potential allies, you are giving the enemy the environment needed to co-opt your soldiers for intelligence purposes or for direct attacks. The Institute for the Study of War studied green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan from 2007-2012, and they suggest that:

There are two main narratives purporting to explain why green-on-blue attacks happen and why they are happening more frequently: grievances and infiltration. Grievance-based insider attacks occur because of cultural misunderstandings between foreign and Afghan troops, low morale, and revenge for perceived insults or provocations. Attacks caused by insurgent initiative are pre-planned violence organized by groups like the Quetta Shura Taliban or their Haqqani Network associates who have infiltrated the ANSF or influenced existing members to execute attacks.

3. In all your interactions, be genuine (or as genuine as you possibly can). This goes right along with rule number two. People intuitively know when you aren’t being real. They can sense when they are being used. Sometimes that’s okay. When you both have something the other wants, then that can be used. But understand the relationship will only last as long as it is mutually beneficial.

4. Find out their motivation. Even before the first time you meet them, you should be studying. Learn as much as you can about their culture and their society. Try to learn the rules. If you know people who have been there and know the different personalities, talk to them and ask them questions. From the first time you meet, you need to listen and assess what is said, learn to hear what wasn’t said, and try to understand them. Try and see what makes them tick. What is their motivation? What do they want or need? Don’t go in with your preconceived notions set in stone; everything must be fluid. Very often, the truth on the ground is different than what you originally thought.

5. Come up with a plan. During every interaction, more information or data will come to you. Learn to be able to see those little pieces, and understand what they are and what they mean. Some information may not be useful now, but it very well might come in handy in the future. Figure out what you want, what they want, and then try to come up with a plan where all parties win. This is not espionage or trying to get dirt on someone, this is attempting to build relationships with people where everyone benefits.

The best analogy to explain the difference between building rapport and building relationships for more sinister motivations such as espionage, is the act of trying to meet girls. Take, for example, those who are just trying to meet girls to get laid, have a one-night stand, and then bounce, versus those who are trying to meet a girl because they think they could have a real relationship with her. The latter would be what I consider rapport.

6. Be willing to invest time, money, or assets. For this relationship to be real, for it to be more than just both of you temporarily using each other, it takes time. It doesn't happen overnight; it takes time, energy, trust, and coming through with what you promised. Helping them without expecting anything back, eating dinner with them, drinking tea, participating with them through hard times and common struggles. When they know you are willing to put your money, time, energy, and body on the line for them, they will start to open up. That is when the important stuff happens.

I will finish this up with a couple of points.

• Never promise them something you are not 100 percent sure you can deliver on. If you say you can do or deliver something, be damn sure you can follow through.
• Never go more than 49-percent native. You may empathize, sympathize, and genuinely like the people you are working with. That’s good. That’s what you want. But in a military setting, never forget that you are an American, and a representative of America. It’s easy to get sucked in with those men you’ve sweated and bled alongside, but in the end, you do what you are told. In the civilian world, don’t give up so much of yourself that you forget who you truly are.

This video is textbook in what not to do when conducting FID and attempting to build rapport: How not to do FID.